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ABSTRACT 
A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL SLACK ON FIRM 
INNOVATION 
 
by 
 
Tony Lewis 
 
 
The University of Wisconsin–Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Edward Levitas 
 
 
 
I analyze the effect of financial slack on firm innovation by reviewing prior research and 
conducting an empirical analysis.  The goal of this paper is to describe, refine and expand 
research on the relationship between financial slack and innovation.  I describe  how past 
scholars‟ conceptualizations and operationalizations of financial slack vary across studies 
and are often inconsistent with theoretical definitions suggesting that financial slack is a 
resource that exists in excess of some foreseeable need.  My theoretical analysis suggests 
that one solution to this problem may be to operationalize financial slack as a proportion 
of total R&D spending (what I refer to as the financial slack-R&D ratio).  Research 
suggests that innovation outcomes may be more strongly affected by the ratio of financial 
slack relative to total R&D spending than by financial slack measured independent of 
R&D spending.  However, few, if any scholars have operationalized financial slack as a 
proportion of total R&D spending.  I assess the moderating role of project and 
department level variables that are easily observable (readily accessible to firm 
managers), universal (found across firms and across industries) and for which the 
management literature provides conflicting support regarding their likely influence on the 
financial slack-innovation relationship.  Specifically, I explore the influence of portfolio 
 iii 
 
effects (the number and diversity of R&D projects) and maturity effects (nearness to 
completion) on the amount of financial slack-R&D ratio needed to optimize innovation 
outcomes.  I test my hypotheses using data from a sample of U.S.-based biotechnology 
firms attempting to develop new pharmaceutical drugs. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over recent years, much scholarly attention has focused on the relationship 
between financial slack (defined here as cash possessed by the firm that is not committed 
to a specific foreseeable expense) and firm innovation (e.g., Greve, 2003; Hall, 2002; 
Mishina et al., 2004; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Thompson, 1967; Vicente-Lorente, 2001; 
Voss et al., 2008).  This is because the degree to which firms are able to achieve high 
performance is strongly linked to both the successful management of innovation (O‟Brien, 
2003) and the successful management of financial slack (Chakravarthy, 1986).  Moreover, 
financial slack and innovation are thought to have a strong effect on each other, 
particularly in technologically dynamic industries (Greve, 2003; Mishina et al., 2004).  
For example, pursuing a strategy of innovation often makes firms more dependent on 
financial slack as a safeguard against the challenges and pitfalls associated with research 
and development (R&D) (Hall, 2002; Vicente-Lorente, 2001).  Conversely, financial 
slack may insulate firms from their environment and result in agency effects, potentially 
leading to innovations that are less likely to be successfully commercialized or that are 
less profitable (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001). 
Though debate exists as to which effects are stronger and when, financial slack is 
thought to have both positive (Hall, 2002; Vicente-Lorente, 2001) and negative (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1964) effects on firm innovation.  Research that attempts to 
reconcile divergent views converges on the idea that an inverse U-shaped relationship 
exists between financial slack and firm innovation (e.g., Herold et al., 2006; Nohria & 
Gulati, 1996).  What I refer to throughout this manuscript as the inverse U-shaped 
perspective posits that financial slack allows firms to better manage the uncertainty 
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associated with innovation, explaining the increase in firm innovation per dollar of 
financial slack that occurs as firms move from low to more average levels of financial 
slack (Herold et al., 2006; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  On the other hand, it also creates a 
managerial safety net that results in agency costs (e.g., putting forth less effort in 
deliberating managerial decisions) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1964) and 
opportunity costs (leaving cash idle rather than investing it) (Opler et al., 1999).  Agency 
and opportunity costs explain the decrease in firm innovation per dollar of financial slack 
that occurs as firms move from average to above average levels of financial slack (Herold 
et al., 2006; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  This relationship is mirrored in research exploring 
the effect of financial slack on firm performance (e.g., George, 2005; Tan & Peng, 2003) 
as may be expected given that that a strong link exists between firm innovation and firm 
performance (O‟Brien, 2003). 
Though the inverse U-shaped perspective has many interesting theoretical 
implications, few scholars have expanded on this work, leaving important practitioner 
concerns unanswered.  For example, the inverse U-shaped perspective implies that firms 
will optimize innovation outcomes by holding stores of financial slack that are average 
relative to similar firms.  This prescription is not sensitive to differences in project or firm 
level characteristics or to changes in firm strategy (e.g., an increase in the scale of R&D 
activity).  Moreover, managers often may not know how much financial slack their 
competitors are holding because the amount may fluctuate or be kept secret.  Furthermore, 
debate exists as to whether the relationship between financial slack and firm innovation 
truly has an inverse U-shape.  Research is unclear whether financial slack results in 
negative or just diminishing innovation at extreme high levels (Herold et al., 2006).  
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Scholarship that supports a negative relationship relies on a small number of outlier 
observations (Herold et al., 2006). 
The goal of this paper is to better understand how firms are able to optimize the 
innovation benefits of financial slack while minimizing its significant agency and 
opportunity costs.  I will depart from prior research on the financial slack-innovation 
relationship in two significant ways.  First, research suggests that innovation outcomes 
may be more strongly affected by the ratio of financial slack relative to total R&D 
spending rather than by financial slack alone (e.g., O‟Brien, 2003).  However, few, if any 
scholars have operationalized financial slack as a proportion of total R&D spending 
(what I refer to as the financial slack-R&D ratio).  Moreover, my research suggests that 
measuring financial slack as a proportion of total R&D spending (rather than independent 
of R&D) may have significant theoretical and practical benefits.  A measure of financial 
slack that is proportional to R&D spending is sensitive to potential portfolio effects and it 
is easier for managers to utilize in a real innovation context).  Hence, I operationalize 
financial slack as a proportion of total R&D spending.   
Second, scholars have been reluctant to explore department and project-level 
factors because the inner workings of firms‟ innovative activities are fraught with 
complexity, secrecy, and context-specific peculiarities (Adams et al., 2006).  Because 
powerful influences on the relationship between financial slack and firm innovation may 
occur at the project and department level, I will focus my analysis on discrete innovation 
outcomes occurring throughout a sequential progression of R&D stages.   
To minimize the problems of opacity and external validity described by Adams et 
al., (2006), I assess the moderating role of project and department level variables that are 
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easily observable (readily accessible to firm managers) and universal (found across firms 
and across industries).  Conflicting support can be found in the management literature for 
each of the moderating variables included in this study regarding their likely effect on the 
financial slack-innovation relationship. 
Hence, I present conflicting hypotheses regarding the potential moderating effect 
for three such variables.  The first two variables I explore include the number of R&D 
projects and the degree of technological diversity between them.  Research suggests that 
increasing the number and technological diversity of R&D projects may result in a 
portfolio effect (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994), potentially decreasing the need for 
financial slack as a safeguard.  Conversely, increasing the number and diversity of R&D 
projects may also result in increased planning and coordination challenges (Lubatkin & 
Chatterjee, 1994), or what I refer to as “complexity effects.”  As opposed to portfolio 
effects, complexity effects may result in an increased need for financial slack as the 
number and diversity of R&D projects increases.   
The third potential moderating influence on the relationship between financial 
slack and firm innovation I test is project maturity (the nearness of an R&D project to 
completion).  The management literature also provides conflicting evidence regarding the 
likely moderating influence of R&D project maturity.  In the early stages of R&D, firms 
are more uncertain about their ability to overcome the technical challenges associated 
with developing the project (Miller & Folta, 2002; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Roberts & 
Weitzman, 1981), which can lead to greater dependence on financial slack as a safeguard.  
Alternatively, greater dependence on financial slack may occur in the later stages of R&D.  
In the later stages, design revisions and corrections become much more costly and 
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unpredictable (Miller & Folta, 2002), which may lead to an increased need for financial 
slack to cover such expenses. 
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CHAPTER 2: LITRATURE REVIEW 
 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Previous research has linked effective management of financial slack to the 
growth and survival of firms (Penrose, 1959), particularly in technologically dynamic 
industries (Greve, 2003; Mishina et al., 2004).  Scholars attribute this relationship to the 
fact that innovation results in firm assets that have high transaction costs (they are 
difficult to buy and sell) (Pisano, 1990) and high adjustment costs (it is costly to 
significantly scale up or scale down the ongoing rate of investment) (Himmelberg & 
Petersen, 1994).  Moreover, overly optimistic or inattentive managers are likely to 
underestimate or ignore foreseeable costs (Lant, 1985; Schiff & Lewin, 1970), potentially 
leading to more R&D budget shortfalls and fewer surpluses.  Internally-held cash that is 
not committed to a predefined purpose is the most efficient internal resource that firms 
can use to supplant R&D budget shortfalls because it is unabsorbed (not committed to an 
alternate use) and because it is generic (has a wide variety of potential uses) (Greve, 2003; 
Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 2008).  Furthermore, financial slack allows innovative 
firms to avoid soliciting external capital markets (which can be especially costly in the 
R&D context due to information asymmetries and high degrees of success uncertainty; 
Hall, 2002; Vicente-Lorente, 2001). 
The goal of this chapter is to summarize scholarly work examining the 
relationship between financial slack and firm innovation.  I begin by describing how 
researchers have used multiple and sometimes inconsistent conceptualizations of 
financial slack, potentially leading to significant concerns regarding construct validity.  I 
then discuss the degree to which various popular measures of financial slack accurately 
7 
 
 
 
measure the construct as it has been theoretically defined as a resource that exists in 
excess of some minimal level of foreseeable need (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Miller & 
Leiblein, 1996; Mishina et al., 2004).  Next, I review conflicting prior research that 
suggests that either a positive (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; Hall, 2002; O‟Brien, 2003; 
Thompson, 1967; Vicente-Lorente, 2001) or negative (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Williamson, 1964) relationship exists between financial slack and 
innovation.  Following that, I discuss how scholars reconcile these views by proposing 
that financial slack has a positive effect on innovation at low levels and a diminished, or 
even negative effect at high levels (an inverse U-shaped relationship) (e.g., Herold et al., 
2006; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  Ultimately, my research in this chapter suggests that 
measuring financial slack as a proportion of total R&D spending may provide important 
insights.  I conclude by discussing the implications of the inverse U-shaped perspective, 
its limitations, as well as potential avenues for future research. 
SLACK AND FINANCIAL SLACK 
 Before I define financial slack, it is important to establish a clear understanding of 
the broader umbrella of „slack‟ under which the term falls.  Of the multitude of variations 
on the basic definition of slack presented in the management literature, most definitions 
converge on the idea that slack refers to a resource that exists in excess of some minimal 
level of foreseeable need (e.g., Bourgeois, 1981; Child, 1972; Cyert & March, 1963; 
March & Shapira, 1987; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  Accordingly, scholars suggest that 
financial slack is cash that exists in excess of some minimal level of predetermined 
operational use (e.g., Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Mishina et al., 2004). 
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However, numerous conceptualizations of financial slack ignore this important 
condition.  For example, some scholars suggest that the term financial slack can be used 
interchangeably with words like „cash‟ (e.g., Sharfman et al., 1988; Voss et al., 2008), 
„liquidity‟ (e.g., Daniel et al., 2004; Levitas & McFadyen, 2009), or „low leverage‟ (e.g., 
O‟Brien, 2003).  This potentially creates construct validity problems because it implies 
that financial slack is simply the product of firm managers‟ preference for internal (equity) 
financing ahead of external (debt) financing.  However, the total stock of cash (or 
liquidity) held by a firm cannot be accurately termed „financial slack.‟ Only that portion 
which is not already reserved for a specific, planned use should be conceptualized as 
financial slack.  Operationalizations of financial slack should also conform to this 
requirement (see Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Mishina et al., 2004; Moses, 
1992) 
Scholars have suggested that those who are unsure about whether a particular cash 
resource may also be characterized as financial slack should describe the extent to which 
that resource is absorbed (committed to a specific use) or unabsorbed (uncommitted to 
any specific use) (e.g., Greve, 2003; Singh, 1986; Voss et al., 2008).  Only resources that 
are highly unabsorbed should be characterized as financial slack (Voss et al., 2008).  
Greve (2003) suggested that scholars should use the term „absorbed financial slack‟ to 
describe liquid firm assets that are committed to a predetermined use.  Mishina et al. 
(2004) suggested that scholars should use the term „negative financial slack.‟  I argue that 
both of these terms increase existing confusion regarding the theoretical requirement that 
financial slack must be in excess of foreseeable need (absorbed or negative financial 
slack is, by definition, not in excess of foreseeable need).  Hence, throughout this 
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manuscript, I use the generic term „financial slack‟ in reference to unabsorbed or 
uncommitted idle cash reserves.  When referring to firm liquidity committed to a 
foreseeable use, I will specify by using the term „absorbed liquidity.‟ 
It is important to draw a clear distinction between financial slack and absorbed 
liquidity because they have dissimilar costs and benefits (Singh, 1986).  Financial slack 
(an idle resource uncommitted to any other use) is more costly for firms to hold than 
absorbed liquidity, which can be at least partially committed to another use (e.g., cash 
reserved for a marketing campaign that could be abandoned or postponed) (Greve, 2003; 
Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 2008).  Furthermore, financial slack is cheaper and 
easier to access than absorbed liquidity, so it can be more effectively utilized as a 
resource to supplant R&D budget shortfalls or to pursue emergent opportunities.  
Scholars attempting to understand the firm-level strategic implications of holding liquid 
assets should be precise about the specific resource they are observing. 
MEASURING FINANCIAL SLACK 
Past scholars offer some useful guidelines with regard to how researchers should 
operationalize financial slack despite the challenges of discerning between absorbed 
liquidity and financial slack.  For example, Moses (1992) argued that the best way to 
operationalize financial slack as existing in excess of foreseeable need is by calculating 
the difference between current assets and current liabilities.  However, Bourgeois (1981) 
argued that, from a research perspective, relative measures of slack are generally more 
useful.
1
  Hence, using the current ratio (current assets divided by current liabilities) to 
operationalize financial slack (e.g., Greve, 2003; Kim et al., 2008; Singh, 1986) may 
                                                             
1
 See Bourgeois (1981: 37) for a complete review of the theoretical, methodological and operational 
benefits of utilizing relative measures of organizational slack as opposed to absolute measures 
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result in more valid and generalizable empirical findings.  Regardless if they are absolute 
or relative, operationalizations that attempt to measure the amount of cash held by the 
firm that is above and beyond some minimum level of operational need (e.g., current 
liabilities) are most consistent with theoretical definitions of financial slack existing in 
excess of foreseeable need.   
Other scholars have used the difference between cash held by the focal firm and 
the average cash held by a sample of similar firms to calculate financial slack (e.g., 
Litschert & Bonham, 1978).  This approach may be useful when the current ratio is not 
available (e.g., department-level analyses of diversified firms).  However, it should be 
noted that the average cash held by a sample of firms is not a very good indicator of a 
firm‟s foreseeable need since that could vary significantly across firms.  Controlling for 
some of the primary antecedents of financial slack (e.g., firm size, sales revenue, liquidity) 
may help to mitigate this problem. Other scholars suggested measuring both absorbed 
and unabsorbed financial slack to detect differences caused by the level of absorption 
(e.g., Greve, 2003; Singh, 1986). 
Perceptual measures also can be utilized to capture managers‟ conceptualization 
of how much cash is held in excess of foreseeable need.  However, firm managers 
generally underestimate costs and overestimate revenues (Lant, 1985), so the 
questionnaires that accompany such measures need to be carefully worded so as to 
capture cash that is truly in excess of projected demand.  Research suggests that the best 
way to achieve this is to employ questions that require managers to describe the amount 
of organizational disruption (or cost) the organization would experience if an amount of 
cash were removed from the operating budget (e.g., Lant, 1985). 
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THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL SLACK ON FIRM INNOVATION 
 
The positive effects of financial slack on firm innovation 
Three basic assumptions form the foundation for the view that financial slack has 
a positive effect on firm innovation.  I use the term „innovation‟ throughout this 
manuscript in reference to new products or ideas that have been successfully 
commercialized (Schumpeter, 1934).  The first assumption is that R&D projects require 
assets that are sensitive to volatility in the ongoing rate of investment (Hall, 2002; 
O‟Brien, 2003; Pisano, 1990).  The second assumption is that R&D projects inherently 
cause problems of information asymmetry between firm managers and prospective 
investors, thereby restricting access to external sources of capital (Hall, 2002; Levitas & 
McFadyen, 2009; Vicente-Lorente, 2001).  The third assumption is that uncommitted 
stores of cash represent the most efficient resource firms have available to cover 
unexpected R&D costs or to supplant shortfalls in the availability of investment capital 
(Greve, 2003; Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 2008). The strategy of supplementing 
innovation budget shortfalls using a stockpile of uncommitted cash is known as „technical 
buffering‟ (Bourgeois, 1981; Thompson, 1967) or „R&D smoothing‟ (Brown & Petersen, 
2011).  Each of the assumptions associated with what I will refer to hereafter as the 
technical buffering perspective are described in greater detail below. 
Sensitivity to the ongoing rate of investment. The first assumption of the 
technical buffering perspective is that pursuing a strategy of innovation generally causes 
firms to make investments that increase their vulnerability to volatility in the availability 
of external sources of investment capital (Hall, 2002; O‟Brien, 2003; Pisano, 1990).  This 
is largely because R&D projects usually involve highly skilled labor and/or specialized 
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equipment (Hall, 2002).  Such assets have high transaction costs (they are difficult to buy 
and sell) (Pisano, 1990) and high adjustment costs (it is costly to significantly scale up or 
scale down the ongoing rate of investment) (Himmelberg & Petersen, 1994).  R&D 
projects also tend to have uncertain costs that can fluctuate significantly (Greve, 2003).  
For example, human and mechanical failures can lead to major delays and wasted effort.  
Failing to increase project investment in the face of unexpected cost increases requires 
firms to incur high adjustment and/or transaction costs (O‟Brien, 2003).  Furthermore, 
managers‟ tendency to be overly optimistic about their ability to achieve innovation 
causes an increased likelihood that actual costs of R&D projects will exceed projected 
costs (Lant, 1985).  Maintaining a store of financial slack may help managers to avoid the 
high adjustment costs and transaction costs associated with cash flow volatility, 
unexpected increases in the cost of development, and managerial failure to foresee 
significant costs. 
Restricted external investment. R&D projects also cause problems of information 
asymmetry between firm managers and prospective investors that restrict firms‟ access to 
external sources of investment capital (Hall, 2002; Levitas & McFadyen, 2009; Vicente-
Lorente, 2001).  Prospective investors often find managers‟ claims about the future value 
of R&D projects difficult to verify because such projects tend to be risky, complex, and 
secretive in nature (Hall, 2002; O‟Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001).  Managers also 
may be motivated to artificially inflate the value of firm investments to attract investment 
capital (Peng et al., 2010; Qian & Li, 2010) which may exacerbate the information 
asymmetry problem.  As a result, Hall (2002: 5) argued, “the marketplace for financing 
the development of innovative ideas looks like the „lemons‟ market modeled by Akerlof 
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(1970). The lemons' premium for R&D will be higher than that for ordinary investment 
because investors have more difficulty distinguishing good projects from bad.”  
Moreover, investments in innovation are highly specific and difficult to redeploy.  Hence, 
they often serve as a poor source of debt collateral (Vicente-Lorente, 2001).  Therefore, 
firms that are more R&D intensive generally experience more difficulty accessing 
external sources of capital (Hall, 2002; O‟Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001). 
Financial slack as a resource for R&D. Because financial slack is the most 
unabsorbed (most accessible) and most generic (greatest variety of potential uses) type of 
slack, it is ideal for covering the unexpected resource shortfalls that characterize firm 
innovation efforts (Greve, 2003; Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 2008).  While more 
absorbed types of slack are theoretically accessible to firm managers, practicality 
concerns and political jockeying by influential internal stakeholder groups often make its 
actual recovery and utilization costly or problematic (Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 
2008).  Firm managers may be more willing and able to risk discretionary cash resources 
in the search for new sources of competitive advantage than other forms of slack that are 
more difficult to repurpose or replenish (e.g., human resource slack) (Voss et al., 2008).  
Accordingly, innovative firms tend to suffer decreased performance when they ignore the 
increased level of financial slack that pursuing a strategy of innovation demands (O‟Brien, 
2003). 
The negative effects of financial slack on firm innovation 
Financial slack may also have negative effects on firms‟ ability to successfully 
innovate.  First, by holding financial slack firms incur opportunity costs (costs associated 
with holding cash in reserve rather than investing it) (Opler et al., 1999). Idle cash may or 
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may not be used to cover the unexpected R&D costs and cannot be used to expand 
planned innovation efforts.   
Second, agency theorists argue that financial slack degrades firms‟ innovative 
efficiency by making firm managers less diligent (not dedicating their full effort) and 
more opportunistic (accumulating personal benefits from firm resources) (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Williamson, 1964).  For example, less diligent managers may fail to 
give adequate administrative consideration to all available R&D alternatives.  
Opportunistic managers may pursue attention-grabbing new products when the firm 
really needs a more discrete overhaul of its distribution strategy.   
Agency scholars suggest that the buffering concept described by Thompson 
(1967), initially used to illustrate the positive effects of financial slack, may result in 
negative long-term effects.  Specifically, Kraatz & Zajac (2001) agreed that financial 
slack allows firms to engage in buffering.  However, they argued that the long-term effect 
is that firms will make continually more elastic responses to environmental change.  
From this perspective, high levels of financial slack loosen the coupling between the firm 
and its environment, thereby desensitizing firm managers to changes in market conditions 
(Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  The assumption is that over time the separation between the 
firm‟s competitive advantage and the demands of the market will grow, thereby reducing 
firm performance. 
The divergence between technical buffering and agency views of the effect of 
financial slack on firm innovation hinges on two basic discrepancies.  The first major 
discrepancy is about the role of uncertainty. Agency theorists are in agreement with the 
technical buffering perspective that slack resources buffer firms against uncertainty, 
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thereby simplifying the coordination challenges associated with managing an innovative 
firm (Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  However, the technical buffering view supposes that 
managers, freed from constantly reallocating resources to meet the day-to-day budgetary 
uncertainties associated with firm innovation, will instead focus their energy on achieving 
long-term competitive advantage (Bourgeois, 1981; Thompson, 1967).  Conversely, the 
agency view assumes that the predominant effect of the reduced uncertainty is that 
managers become less diligent, failing to dedicate their full efforts toward planning and 
revising firm investments (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; 
Williamson, 1964).  Financial slack may give firm managers increased certainty that they 
will successfully complete the R&D projects that they choose to pursue (Mishina et al., 
2004).  However, agency theorists argue that overall the effect will be negative because 
managers will choose inferior projects and will not dedicate their full effort to ensuring 
rapid and efficient completion (Greve, 2003). 
The second major discrepancy between the technical buffering and agency 
perspectives concerns the perceived of importance of the degree to which a firm is able to 
achieve co-alignment with market demand.  Agency theorists assume that to optimize 
performance, firms must at all times strive to achieve the maximum level of alignment 
possible with the demands of the external market (financial slack creates a buffer 
between the firm and the environment, decreasing environmental alignment and 
presumably, performance; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001).  However, the technical buffering 
perspective gives more weight to the role of establishing long-term core firm 
competencies and continually developing them over time.  It inherently places less 
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importance on the degree to which firms successfully conform to shorter-term 
fluctuations in market demand. 
Reconciling positive and negative views of financial slack 
Scholars have empirically explored the influence that technical buffering and 
agency effects have on firm innovation and firm performance.  Results on both dependent 
variables mirror one another, which is expected given the strong link that exists between 
innovation and firm performance (O‟Brien, 2003).  Broadly, researchers find that 
financial slack has an inverse U-shaped relationship with both firm innovation (e.g., 
Herold et al., 2006; Nohria & Gulati, 1996) and with firm performance (e.g., George, 
2005; Tan & Peng, 2003).   The inverse U-shaped perspective posits that financial slack 
allows firms to better manage the uncertainty associated with innovation, explaining the 
marginal increase in firm innovation that occurs as firms move from low to more average 
levels of financial slack (Herold et al., 2006; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  Conversely, it also 
results in agency costs, explaining the marginal decrease in firm innovation that occurs as 
firms move from average to above average levels of financial slack (Herold et al., 2006; 
Nohria & Gulati, 1996).   
However, the question of whether or not financial slack results in diminishing 
positive returns on innovation or whether it may actually have a negative effect on 
innovation at very high levels remains an important and unanswered question in the 
managerial literature (Herold et al., 2006).  Prior studies indicating that high levels of 
financial slack have a negative effect on innovation rely on a few outlier observations 
(e.g., Herold et al., 2006; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  These studies indicate that at very 
high levels of financial slack firms may actually experience worse innovation outcomes, 
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but relying on outlier observations leaves significant questions about validity (Herold et 
al., 2006).  More studies are needed to triangulate the findings of prior researchers 
regarding whether the relationship between financial slack and innovation is truly inverse 
U-shaped (actually results in a decrease in total firm innovation at very high levels), or 
just curvilinear (only results in a lower increase in total firm innovation at very high 
levels) (Herold et al., 2006). 
Prior scholarly works have attempted to refine the inverse U-shaped perspective 
by considering how the financial slack-innovation relationship may be altered by 
variance in the conditions of the external market (e.g., Martinez & Artz, 2006); by 
variance in the type of firm pursuing the innovation (e.g., Geiger & Makri, 2006); by 
variance in the type of innovation being pursued (e.g., Voss et al., 2006); and by variance 
in the type of managers who pursue innovation (e.g., Greve, 2003).  Martinez & Artz 
(2006) found that industry regulation can suppress firms‟ propensity to utilize financial 
slack in the pursuit of risky investments like innovation.  The analysis of Geiger & Makri 
(2006) assessed how changes in the type of innovation firms pursue may affect the 
financial slack- innovation relationship.  Their analysis suggested that highly R&D 
intensive firms are significantly more likely to successfully use financial slack in 
developing a great number of technologically diverse innovations.   
Additionally, Voss et al. (2006) hypothesized that high levels of financial slack 
will cause firm managers to engage in more risky exploratory innovation and that low 
levels of financial slack will cause managers to pursue innovation projects that exploit 
previous firm knowledge.  Despite being firmly rooted in prior research (e.g., Mishina et 
al., 2004; Nohria & Gulati, 1996; Tan & Peng, 2003), Voss et al. (2006) found no 
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support for either of these hypotheses.  Greve‟s (2003) analysis may offer some 
explanation. He suggested that the financial slack- innovation relationship may be 
moderated by managerial propensity to engage in problemistic search (increased 
investment in innovation caused by managerial aspirations exceeding actual firm 
performance).  Specifically, he found that when managerial aspirations exceed actual 
performance, firms are more likely to use financial resources to fuel innovation (Greve, 
2003).  From this perspective, the key to maximizing the positive effects of financial 
slack on firm innovation is to keep managerial aspirations high, despite the fact that a 
common antecedent of financial slack is firm performance exceeding normal expectations 
(Cyert & March, 1963). 
PROPORTIONAL MEASURES OF FINANCIAL SLACK 
 The inverse U-shaped perspective has added considerable insight to scholars‟ 
understanding of the relationship between financial slack and firm innovation.  However, 
by considering the level of total R&D spending relative to financial slack (what I refer to 
as the financial slack-R&D ratio) scholars may gain important insights.  For example, 
O‟Brien (2003) found that firms that ignore the increased need for financial slack that 
occurs as R&D efforts expand suffer significantly depressed performance.  O‟Brien‟s 
(2003) findings raise some internal validity questions regarding the inverse U-shaped 
perspective.  He suggests that some of the decline in innovation output that occurs as 
firms hold higher levels of financial slack may be due to a lack of proportionality 
between financial slack and innovation resources.  
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I highlight some of the central ideas presented in scholarly work 
that explores the relationship between financial slack and firm innovation.  The intent is 
to underscore theoretical and empirical research concerns that may affect study in this 
field.  I also identify some gaps in the innovation literature.  For example, scholars have 
expanded knowledge of the factors that affect the relationship between financial slack 
and innovation at the market level (e.g., Martinez & Artz, 2006), the firm level (e.g., 
Geiger & Makri, 2006), and the individual level (e.g., Greve, 2003).  However, few have 
explored innovation at the department or project level.  Because important influence on 
the success of innovation projects may occur at the project level (Benner & Tushman, 
2002, 2003; Christensen & Raynor, 2003), it is important that researchers explore 
department and project level factors that may affect the financial slack-innovation 
relationship. 
Adams et al. (2006) suggested that scholars‟ reluctance to empirically assess the 
inner workings of firms‟ innovative activities results from the secretive and complex 
nature of R&D and difficulty in generalizing findings across firms and across industries.  
To mitigate these problems, innovation research should assess variables that are easily 
observable (readily accessible to firm managers) and universal (found across firms and 
across industries) so that theoretical findings can be easily understood and utilized by 
practitioners.  However, researchers should also be careful to account for differences 
across contexts (e.g., different countries and industries).  By replicating innovation 
research in varying business environments, scholars may more accurately estimate the 
amount of financial slack firms require to optimize innovation outcomes. 
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Exploring the relationship between financial slack and firm innovation requires 
theoretical perspectives that are inclusive enough to be broadly understood, while being 
specific enough to be applicable to individual firms trying to achieve innovation.  In the 
following chapters I utilize the ideas described above to guide my empirical research.  
My goal is to identify novel and important relationships that are potentially more 
theoretically useful and practically relevant than those described in prior research.   
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Research on the relationship between financial slack and firm innovation has 
resulted in some significant findings that have shaped conventional understanding.  
Specifically, research suggests that financial slack has an inverse U-shaped relationship 
with firm innovation (e.g., Herold et al., 2006; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).  While 
identifying that an inverse U-shaped relationship exists is useful on a theoretical level, 
many questions remain regarding the practitioner application of this knowledge.  As 
described above, this approach is not sensitive to basic changes in firms‟ innovation 
strategies (e.g., an expansion of innovation efforts).  Also, managers may not know how 
much financial slack competitor firms hold since this amount may vary or be kept secret.  
I argue that measuring financial slack as a proportion of total R&D spending may result 
in significant theoretical benefits (more sensitivity to portfolio effects) and practitioner 
advantages (more easily utilized to determine the optimal level of financial slack). 
I identify three variables that are easily observable, universal, and for which 
conflicting theoretical support exists regarding their likely effect on the relationship 
between financial slack and firm innovation.  I explore how the number of innovation 
projects, the degree of diversity between them, and their nearness to completion affect the 
need for financial slack to optimize innovation outcomes. 
The need for financial slack is not driven by just the total amount of innovation a 
firm wants to achieve, but also by the number and the diversity of innovation projects that 
a firm is simultaneously pursuing (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994). Benefits associated 
with increasing the number of investments in a portfolio may occur as risk is shared 
across multiple R&D projects.  As the number of R&D projects increase, portfolio effects 
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may reduce the amount of financial slack needed as a safeguard against the challenges 
associated with pursuing a strategy of innovation.  In addition to sharing risk, spillover 
effects (advances achieved in one technology as a result of exploring a related technology) 
also may allow firms to share benefits across a number of R&D projects (Garcia-Vega, 
2006), potentially reducing the need for financial slack as a safeguard.   
Conversely, challenges tied to increasing the number of investments in a portfolio 
may have the opposite influence on the risk associated with pursuing multiple R&D 
projects.  As firms increase the number of R&D projects they pursue, they may 
experience costly internal planning and coordination challenges that increase the 
likelihood of setbacks and cost overruns (Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-Vega, 2006), 
possibly increasing the need for financial slack as a safeguard. 
Consistent with portfolio theory, the diversity of innovation projects that a firm is 
pursuing may also influence the amount of financial slack needed as safeguard against 
the challenges of pursuing a strategy of innovation.  Technological diversity describes the 
degree to which projects in a firm‟s R&D portfolio draw on technologies that are 
dissimilar from one another.  On one hand, having an R&D portfolio with high 
technological diversity could result in firm-level synergies (sharing of risks and benefits) 
that may decrease the need for financial slack (Hall, 2002; O‟Brien, 2003; Vicente-
Lorente, 2001).  On the other hand, heightened complexity could result in an increased 
likelihood of unexpected setbacks and cost overruns (Benner & Tushman, 2002, 2003; 
Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-Vega, 2006; Tushman & O‟Reilly, 1996; March, 1991) that 
may increase the need for financial slack.  Moreover, debate exists as to whether 
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technological diversity enhances or diminishes spillover effects (Breschi et al., 2003; 
Garcia-Vega, 2006). 
The management literature is similarly conflicted about the role of project 
maturity (the nearness of an R&D project to completion).  Research indicates that a shift 
in the type of uncertainty associated with an R&D project occurs as it nears completion 
(e.g., Miller & Folta, 2002; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Roberts & Weitzman, 1981).  In the 
early stages of innovation, R&D projects are mainly dominated by uncertainty as to 
whether the firm will be able to overcome the technical demands associated with the 
project.  In the later stages of innovation, R&D projects become more exposed to changes 
in market conditions.  Specifically, as R&D projects near completion the cost of design 
changes in response to fluctuations in market conditions increases (Miller & Folta, 2002; 
Roberts & Weitzman, 1981).  The management literature is unclear whether financial 
slack may be more useful in helping firms to overcome the uncertainty that characterizes 
the early versus the late stages of R&D (or if any difference exists at all). 
To test conflicting theoretical implications on the need for financial slack to 
optimize innovation outcomes, I explore data from a sample of U.S.-based biotechnology 
firms attempting to develop new pharmaceutical drugs.  I consider how changes in 
portfolio influences and project maturity may affect how biotech firms are able to 
successfully move individual drugs in development through successive stages of U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval.  Scholars indicate that understanding the 
relationship between financial slack and firm innovation is critical to firms‟ ability to 
achieve high performance (e.g., O‟Brien, 2003).   By exploring the distinct role that the 
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financial slack-R&D ratio may have on firm innovation, I hope to expand theoretical 
understanding of this important field of research.  
THE FINANCIAL SLACK-R&D RATIO 
Prior research that explored the relationship between financial slack and firm 
innovation operationalized financial slack in several ways.  For example, Nohria and 
Gulati (1996) used a conceptual measure, asking managers to estimate the reduction in 
output if the department's annual operating budget was reduced by 10%.  Other scholars 
suggested using the current ratio (e.g., Greve, 2003; Kim et al., 2008; Singh, 1986), or an 
absolute measure of current assets less current liabilities (e.g., Moses, 1992).  Though 
they conform well to the theoretical requirement that financial slack be a resource that 
exists in excess of foreseeable need, these measures may not be ideal for determining the 
optimal level of financial slack that innovative firms should retain. 
O‟Brien (2003) suggested that the proportion of financial slack relative to total 
R&D spending may drive performance outcomes more significantly than financial slack 
alone.  His research findings indicated that firms that ignore the increased demand for 
financial slack that occurs as innovation efforts expand suffer significantly depressed 
performance.   Measuring financial slack as a proportion of total R&D spending (the 
financial slack-R&D ratio) may have other theoretical and practitioner research benefits.   
For example, the financial slack– R&D ratio may be sensitive to potential 
portfolio effects that may occur as the number and diversity of a firm‟s R&D projects 
increase.  Firms pursuing numerous technologically diverse R&D projects may 
experience a portfolio effect whereby innovation projects can share risks and benefits 
between them (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994).  Consider how insurance companies 
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diversify risk among a portfolio of policies, enabling them to retain an ever lower 
proportion of emergency cash relative to the total value of the insured property (while at 
the same time the absolute level of emergency cash needed tends to increase).   
As investments in a portfolio accumulate and diversify, only the proportion of the 
total investment that is at risk needs to be reduced for a portfolio effect to occur; the 
absolute amount that is at risk may increase (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994).  Similar to 
the portfolio effect insurance companies experience, an R&D portfolio effect could result 
in a lower proportion of emergency financial slack relative to total R&D spending needed 
to optimize innovation outcomes (discussed in detail in the next section).  A measure of 
financial slack independent of R&D spending may not be sensitive to this type of effect.  
As the insurance company example demonstrates, the absolute need for cash can increase 
even as the proportional need diminishes.   
In addition to its sensitivity to portfolio effects, the financial slack-R&D ratio 
gives managers an easily observable, internal marker that is sensitive to major changes in 
the scale of R&D activity to help determine the optimal level of financial slack.  The 
inverse U-shaped perspective suggests that managers should hold financial slack that is 
average relative to that of competitor firms to optimize innovation outcomes.  This 
prescription is not sensitive to changes in the focal firm‟s strategy (e.g., expanding 
innovation efforts) and relies on information that may not be readily available to firm 
managers (the financial slack holdings of competitors).  Hence, when assessing the role 
of financial slack on firm innovation I will measure financial slack as a proportion of 
total R&D spending. 
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PORTFOLIO EFFECTS 
Previous scholars have suggested that management practitioners employ financial 
slack as a safeguard against the risk and uncertainty associated with R&D projects (e.g., 
Hall, 2002; O‟Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001).  However, much like a stock 
portfolio, firms may be able to diversify their innovation risk across a range of varied 
R&D investments (Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-Vega, 2006).  Portfolio theory is based on 
the “three legged stool” concept (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994).  When applied to 
strategic management, the central idea is that a firm will be less likely to “tip over” 
(become insolvent) as it adds “legs” (divergent sources of competitive advantage).  Of 
course, the degree to which a stool will avoid tipping over depends on both the number of 
legs it has and the degree to which the legs are pointing in different directions.   
Portfolio theory works in the same way.  The degree to which a portfolio of 
investments can be considered diversified depends on two factors: the number of 
investments and the divergence in the type of risk or uncertainty that exists between them 
(Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994).  The logic of portfolio theory is appealing.  As Lubatkin 
and Chatterjee (1994: 114) put it, “reduce your firm's dependence on a single product, 
market, or technology, reduce your exposure to the hardships and cyclicalities of any 
single business environment, and you'll reduce your firm's corporate risk.”  However, 
increasing the number and diversification of innovation projects also can cause serious 
planning and coordination challenges (what I refer to as „complexity effects‟) that may 
have the opposite influence on firms‟ need for financial slack. 
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The number of R&D projects  
Portfolio and spillover effects could decrease the proportion of idle cash needed to 
serve as a safeguard against R&D setbacks.  Conversely, pursuing multiple innovation 
projects may add complexity and uncertainty (Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-Vega, 2006), 
possibly increasing the likelihood of R&D setbacks and cost overruns.  Moreover, prior 
research indicates that portfolio theory has limited application in explaining the 
performance effect of corporate diversification at the subsidiary firm level (e.g., Lubatkin 
& Chatterjee, 1994).   
The management literature provides divergent perspectives regarding the likely 
effect of increasing the number of R&D projects on firms‟ need for financial slack. 
Hence, I propose competing hypotheses about how complexity and portfolio effects 
associated with the number of R&D projects may influence this relationship.  If 
increasing the number of R&D projects results in portfolio and spillover effects having 
the greatest influence on innovation outcomes then firms with many R&D projects should 
require less financial slack per dollar of R&D investment than firms with few R&D 
projects in order to achieve optimal innovation outcomes. 
 
H1a: Firms that pursue many innovation projects require less financial slack per 
dollar of R&D invested to achieve the same probability of successful innovation 
as firms that pursue few innovation projects. 
  
Conversely, if increasing the number of R&D projects results in complexity 
effects having the greatest influence on innovation outcomes then firms should require 
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more financial slack per dollar spent on R&D as the number of projects increases in order 
to achieve optimal innovation outcomes. 
 
H1b: Firms that pursue many innovation projects require more financial slack 
per dollar of R&D investment to achieve the same probability of successful 
innovation as firms that pursue few innovation projects. 
 
The technological diversity of R&D projects  
As discussed above, the degree to which risk can be diversified in a portfolio 
depends not only on the number of investments, but also on the degree of divergence in 
the type of risk or uncertainty associated with each investment (Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 
1994).  Moreover, the type of risk firms experience from innovation is not consistent 
across R&D projects.  Rather, it can be affected by variation in the type of innovation 
projects that firms choose to pursue (Benner & Tushman, 2002, 2003; Christensen & 
Raynor, 2003).  Prior scholars exploring the effects of technological differences between 
projects in firms‟ R&D portfolio use the term technological diversity to describe the 
degree to which firms have a diversified portfolio of R&D investments (e.g., Breschi et 
al., 2003; Garcia-Vega, 2006).   
Abernathy (1978) was one of the earliest scholars to note that a trade-off exists 
between firms‟ ability to achieve strategic flexibility in the face of environmental change 
and firms‟ ability to maintain operational efficiency in the existing environment.  Firms 
that are more technologically diverse tend to pursue innovations that rely heavily on 
disparate sources of knowledge (Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-Vega, 2006).  Such firms 
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are more flexible and able to rapidly develop new sources of competitive advantage in the 
face of environmental change (Tushman & O‟Reilly, 1996; March, 1991).  Similar to 
firms with product diversification, technologically diverse firms experience risk reduction 
because they can shift between capabilities if market conditions threaten one or more 
firm competencies (Garcia-Vega, 2006).   However, firms with a portfolio of R&D 
projects that are technologically diverse may miss opportunities to exploit established 
knowledge and capabilities obtained through past innovation experiences (Benner & 
Tushman, 2002, 2003; Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-Vega, 2006; Tushman & O‟Reilly, 
1996; March, 1991). 
Conversely, firms that are less technologically diverse tend to pursue innovations 
that repeatedly draw on the same sources of knowledge (Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-
Vega, 2006).  Such firms are more certain of the success of their projects and are able to 
more rapidly innovate due to the decreased complexity caused by focusing on a narrower 
scope of technological know-how (Tushman & O‟Reilly, 1996; March, 1991).  However, 
firms that continuously pursue R&D projects that are technologically similar to previous 
innovations become increasingly monolithic, rigid, and unable to respond to changes in 
the external environment (Benner & Tushman, 2002, 2003; Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-
Vega, 2006; Tushman & O‟Reilly, 1996; March, 1991).   
Thus, the effect of technological diversity on innovative firms‟ need for financial 
slack is unclear.  Research exploring the effect of technological diversification of firm 
performance suggests that moderate levels of related diversification optimize 
performance, while very high or low levels of firm diversification tend to depress 
performance (e.g., Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994).  Debate exists as to whether spillover 
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effects are greater for firms that pursue more related or more unrelated technologies 
(Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-Vega, 2006).  However, Nelson (1959) argued that firms 
that pursue more technologically diverse R&D projects will benefit more from 
unexpected spillover effects than will firms that pursue less technologically diverse R&D 
projects.  Because financial slack is used to cover unexpected setbacks, it is reasonable to 
assume that expected spillover effects would have relatively little effect on the need for 
financial slack.  The unexpected nature of spillover effects in technologically diversified 
firms may more significantly reduce the need for financial slack. 
Other scholars argue that relying on established resources and competencies 
enables firms to innovate more rapidly and efficiently, and to more effectively align with 
market demand than firms that seek new and uncertain resources and capabilities (e.g., 
Teece, 2007).  Moreover, prospective investors may tend to perceive R&D projects that 
depart from a firm‟s established resources and capabilities as significantly more risky 
than R&D projects that do not (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009).  Such investor perceptions 
are likely to cause firms to rely more heavily on financial slack as a resource to fuel 
innovation (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009).  Furthermore, pursuing technologically diverse 
innovation projects can result in many of the same complexity effects as pursuing 
multiple innovation projects (decreased focus and efficiency)  (Benner & Tushman, 2002, 
2003; Breschi et al., 2003; Garcia-Vega, 2006; Tushman & O‟Reilly, 1996; March, 1991). 
In recent years, some empirical research gives support to the notion that 
technological diversity results in better innovation outcomes (e.g., Garcia-Vega, 2006).  
While this research helps to clarify this ambiguous relationship, it is based on a single 
sample of 544 European firms and relies partially on a potentially problematic measure of 
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firm innovation (R&D intensity).  Overall, the management literature provides unclear 
and/or divergent perspectives regarding the role of technological diversity on firms‟ need 
for financial slack.  Therefore, I propose competing hypotheses about how technological 
diversity may influence this relationship.  If increasing the degree of technological 
diversity in a firm‟s R&D portfolio results in spillover and portfolio effects having the 
greatest influence on innovation outcomes, then firms should require less financial slack 
per dollar of R&D investment as technological diversity increases to achieve optimal 
innovation outcomes. 
 
H2a: Firms that pursue innovation projects that are technologically diverse 
require less financial slack per dollar of R&D invested to achieve the same 
probability of successful innovation as firms that pursue innovation projects that 
are not technologically diverse. 
 
Conversely, if increasing the number of R&D projects results in complexity 
effects having the greatest influence on innovation outcomes, then firms should require 
more financial slack per dollar of R&D expense as technological diversity increases to 
achieve optimal innovation outcomes. 
 
H2b: Firms that pursue innovation projects that are technologically diverse 
require more financial slack per dollar of R&D invested to achieve the same 
probability of successful innovation as firms that pursue innovation projects that 
are not technologically diverse. 
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PROJECT MATURITY EFFECTS 
Past scholars offer significant insights on the relationship between the maturity 
(nearness to completion) of innovation projects and the importance of financial slack as a 
resource to fund innovation.  For instance, Nelson & Winter (1977) argued that the 
uncertainty about whether a firm will successfully complete an R&D project declines as 
the project nears completion.  Roberts & Weitzman (1981) introduced the concept of the 
“sequential development project” (SDP).  The SDP describes investments in which costs 
are additive, benefits accrue only upon completion and development can be halted or 
abandoned at any time (Roberts & Weitzman, 1981).  As an SDP moves through 
successive stages, uncertainty about the realization of future benefits is reduced (Roberts 
& Weitzman, 1981).  Miller and Folta (2002) introduced a construct that they termed the 
“compound real option.”  Compound real options are “complex series of nested 
investments [where] initial foothold investments confer privileged access to information 
and opportunities for future investments” (Miller & Folta, 2002: 659).  The value of 
exercising each nested option lies in the reduction of uncertainty about benefits to be 
realized upon completing the project (Miller & Folta, 2002).   
In addition to those mentioned above, numerous other scholars have commented 
on the general tendency for uncertainty about the future costs and benefits associated 
with an R&D project to decline over time (e.g., Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; McGrath, 1997).  
Since financial slack serves as a safeguard against the uncertainty associated with 
pursuing a strategy of innovation (Hall, 2002; O‟Brien, 2003; Vicente-Lorente, 2001), we 
may expect the need for financial slack to decline as a project becomes nears completion.  
Moreover, research suggests that project maturity sends a signal of managerial 
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competence (Nelson & Winter, 1977), potentially increasing access to capital markets 
(Olson, 1997). 
However, scholars also conceive of R&D projects as a “search heuristic,” or a 
complex, interrelated series of decisions broken down into smaller parts (e.g., Miller & 
Folta, 2002; Nelson & Winter, 1977; Roberts & Weitzman, 1981).  From this perspective, 
R&D can be thought of as a process whereby the range of potential action becomes 
narrower and narrower as consecutive decisions are made (Roberts & Weitzman, 1981; 
Miller & Folta, 2002).  Theoretical support for this view can be found in the compound 
real options approach prescribing that managers should delay commitment to any 
particular innovation related decision to preserve a wide range of potential action for as 
long as possible (Miller & Folta, 2002).  For example, once an auto manufacturer decides 
to develop a new pick-up truck, it becomes very costly to decide to instead produce a new 
luxury sedan midway through the design process.  Hence, in the later stages of 
development, firms become more certain that they will be able to overcome the 
technological hurdles required to successfully complete the project (Miller & Folta, 2002; 
Nelson & Winter, 1977; Roberts & Weitzman, 1981).  However, as R&D projects mature, 
the firm also becomes more exposed to uncertainty or volatility in market conditions.  
This is because the cost and complexities associated with making significant changes and 
revisions grow as R&D projects near completion (Miller & Folta, 2002).  An unexpected 
shift in market demand or in the underlying technology could result in immediate, 
unexpected re-design and development costs - the type of costs for which financial slack 
is ideal for covering (Greve, 2003; Mishina et al., 2004; Voss et al., 2008). 
34 
 
 
 
Hence, the management literature is unclear regarding whether financial slack is 
more useful at the early or later stages of an R&D project‟s progression.  On one hand, it 
could help firms overcome to the technological challenges that characterize early stages 
of R&D by providing funds needed to manage unexpected setbacks and budget shortfalls. 
 
H3a: Innovation projects that are more mature require less financial slack per 
dollar of R&D invested to achieve the same probability of successful innovation 
as innovation projects that are less mature. 
 
On the other hand, financial slack could be more useful in the later stages of 
innovation as a safeguard against the increased exposure to changes in market conditions 
that occurs as R&D projects near completion.  Specifically, financial slack may provide 
the funds needed to respond to changes in consumer demand or technological 
development that are more costly to respond to during the late stages of R&D. 
 
H3b: Innovation projects that are more mature require more financial slack per 
dollar of R&D invested to achieve the same probability of successful innovation 
as innovation projects that are less mature. 
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CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
I test my hypotheses using R&D and financial panel data from international, 
publicly-traded biotech firms operating in the U.S from 1993-1999.  R&D project-level 
data consists of the outcome of each drug in development with respect to its regulatory 
approval testing throughout each stage of FDA clinical testing (phase I, phase II, phase 
III and market approval phase).  These data were obtained from the IMS R&D Lifecycle 
database.  To determine the technological diversity of each firm‟s patent portfolio I 
follow Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco (2008).  I utilize the US Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) CASSIS Database to obtain a yearly posting of the total 
number and type of patents owned by a sample of US-based biotech firms.  I obtain 
supplementary patent information (the three-digit USPTO classification) from The 
National Bureau of Economic Research Patent Citations Data File.  After combining the 
three datasets I was left with 761 total observations of the initial 1,225 drugs in 
development.  Additional firm financial data were obtained from COMPUSTAT on the 
Wharton Research Data Services website (WRDS).  After removing observations with 
missing performance data I was left with 354 total drug observations in the clinical stages 
of FDA approval.
2
 
Dependent Variable 
 The dependent variable is coded as a dichotomous variable (pass/fail) with respect 
to the performance of each biotech drug at each stage of the FDA clinical testing process.  
The dependent variable is a yearly measure of whether the drug advanced to the next 
                                                             
2
 Many observations were dropped when obtaining performance data from WRDS because the UWM 
subscription did not go back far enough and I had to utilize a dataset previously downloaded by Dr. Levitas. 
36 
 
 
 
stage (coded „1‟ if the drug advanced to the next stage from 1993-1999, and „0‟ 
otherwise).  Hence, each drug can have as few as one (fail in phase 1) observation, up to 
as many as four observations (passes phase 1, phase 2, phase 3, and market approval 
phase).  Hereafter, we will refer to the dependent variable described above as the 
probability of advancing. 
Independent Variables 
Financial slack-R&D Ratio. Prior research indicates that financial slack is a 
resource that must exist in excess of some minimal level of foreseeable need (e.g., 
Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Mishina et al., 2004).  Working capital 
available is thought to be an effective measure of available cash and working capital 
demanded is thought to be an effective measure of the foreseeable need for cash 
(Bourgeois, 1981).  Hence, working capital available minus working capital demanded is 
a reasonable measure of cash that exists in excess of foreseeable need (Moses, 1992).   
Following prior research (e.g., Brealey & Myers, 1996; Mishina et al., 2004; Moses, 
1992), I calculated financial slack as the difference between working capital available 
and working capital demanded.    I defined working capital available as a firm‟s current 
assets and working capital demanded as a firm‟s current liabilities (Brealey & Myers, 
1996; Mishina et al., 2004; Moses, 1992).   
However, as investments in a portfolio accumulate, only the proportion of the 
total investment that must remain idle as a safeguard needs to be reduced for a portfolio 
effect to occur  (see the “Financial slack-R&D ratio” section in Chapter 3 for a more 
complete discussion of this point).  In my study, financial slack represents the amount of 
the investment that must remain idle, while R&D spending represents the overall scale of 
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a firm‟s investment in innovation.  Because I seek to identify portfolio effects associated 
with R&D activities, I must determine whether the level of financial slack needed to 
optimize innovation outcomes is affected by changes in the scale of innovative activity.   
In measuring this variable, I am not concerned with the degree of efficiency or success 
associated with firm innovation, but simply the overall scale of R&D activity relative to 
the level of financial slack.  Following prior research (e.g., Barker & Mueller, 2002; Ito 
& Pucik, 1993), I use total R&D spending as an indication of this scale.  I measure the 
financial slack-R&D ratio as follows: 
 
(𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑅&𝐷 𝑆𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
  
Number of R&D Projects. I follow prior research (e.g., Fontana et al., 2006) and 
calculated the number of R&D projects as a firm-level variable measured by the total 
number of drugs in any stage of development (preclinical through market approval phase) 
that a firm has pending in the FDA approval process at time t. 
 Technological Diversity. Patent applications are an effective measure of the 
technological competencies that a firm has achieved (Breschi et al., 2003; Verspagen, 
1997).  Applying for a patent means that the firm has (or is near to) overcoming the 
technical barriers that restrict competency in the field (Breschi et al., 2003).  To 
determine the degree of technological diversity across the range of a firm‟s innovative 
know-how, I follow the procedure initially proposed by Jaffe (1986).  Following 
Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco (2008), I use the three-digit USPTO 
classification as the basis for calculating technological diversity.  The technological fields 
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in my sample are indexed by USPTO classification such that j=1, …, 50.  Nij represents 
the number of patents that the i
th
 firm holds in category j, such that  𝑁𝑖𝑗 = 𝑁𝑖 .  A 
Herfindahl concentration is then obtained for each firm and year giving a firm-level 
measure of technological diversity 
 1 −   
𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑖
 
2
 
However, contemporary scholars argue that the procedure proposed by Jaffe 
(1986) may be biased downward for firms with few total patents (e.g., Hall, 2002; 
Garcia-Vega, 2006).  Hall (2002) initially proposed the following variation of the 
Herfindahl index to adjust for the downward bias on firms with few total patents.  
Following Hall (2002) and Garcia-Vega (2006), I calculated the variable technological 
diversity thus 
𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 =   1 −   
𝑁𝑖𝑗
𝑁𝑖
 
2
  
𝑁𝑖
𝑁𝑖 −  1
  
 Project Maturity. The independent variable project maturity is measured by the 
progress the drug has achieved in completing FDA approval testing at the time of the 
observation.  Project-level variables are generated indicating three levels of maturity 
based on the drug‟s position in the clinical FDA approval process.  For example, a drug 
in phase 1 of development at the time of observation is coded “1” under the phase 1 
variable and “0” under all successive project maturity variables.  Drugs in phase 1 testing 
comprise the youngest maturity group and drugs in phase 2 comprise the middle maturity 
group.  Due to a limited number of observations in the latter stages, observations in 
phases III and in the market approval phase were combined to make up the group of 
R&D projects nearest to completion.  No drugs can be in more than one phase 
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simultaneously.  I ran a significance test of the interaction terms (financial slack-R&D 
ratio and each of the three maturity variables) to determine if there is a significant 
difference between the coefficients. 
Control Variables 
Because innovation effectiveness is often dependent on the availability of 
complementary resources (Teece, 1986), I control for several important firm-level 
characteristics.  Past research has suggested that biotech firm size can have a significant 
effect on FDA approval rates (e.g. Olson, 1997).  I control for the size of the firm by 
incorporating the natural log of the book value of total assets.  Past research also suggests 
that the agency costs of financial slack are significantly affected by the capital structure 
of the firm (e.g., Kocchar, 1996).  For this, I control for the long-term leverage of the 
firm by incorporating the debt-to-equity ratio; measured as long term debt divided by 
total shareholders‟ equity.  I incorporated the variable, total capital expenditure to control 
of the firms‟ investments in future growth.  To control for prior performance effects I 
incorporate a one-year lag measure of each firm‟s market-to-book ratio. 
I also included several dummy variables to control for additional firm and project-
level effects.   Scholars suggest that the probability of successfully advancing can be 
influenced by the treatment class for which the drug is primarily targeted (e.g., cancer, 
diabetes).  I therefore control for both the treatment class by including 66 project-level 
dummy variables for each treatment class.  I similarly control for firm and year effects 
with seven dummy variables indicating the year the observation was recorded and 53 
dummy variables indicating the firm primarily responsible for developing the drug.  
Lastly, I include a dummy variable coded “1” if the R&D project was confirmed to be 
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still active at the time of the observation and “0” if the R&D project was reported as 
being inactive (delayed or abandoned). 
Analysis 
 I am interested in the probability of successfully advancing through successive 
stages of the FDA clinical approval testing process among a sample of biotech drugs as 
explained by multiple firm-level and project-level predictors.  I elected to utilize a 
multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression model.  All analyses were performed using 
the -xtmelogit- command in Stata version 12.0 (StataCorp, 2007).  Advantages of logistic 
models are that they allow for binomial response variables (e.g., the drug advances to the 
next stage or it does not).  The multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression model also 
allows for multiple levels of clustering (fixed and random effects) (Stata, 2007), which 
helps to avoid discarding potentially significant variance (Hofmann, 1997). 
RESULTS 
 The 354 observations in my sample represent 158 drugs being developed by 54 
firms.  Two hundred-twelve successful advances to the next clinical phase in the FDA 
approval process were observed.  Descriptive statistics and correlations for all variables 
are presented in Table 1.  Overall, larger firms (with greater total assets) tended to make 
higher capital expenditures and also pursued a greater number of R&D projects that were 
technologically diverse from one another.  Larger firms also held a higher ratio of 
financial slack relative to R&D spending.  Model 2 in Table 2 indicates that there is a 
significant negative relationship between the financial slack-R&D ratio and firm 
innovation.  A likelihood ratio test also shows that the full model is significant (p>chi
2
 
= .05).
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
 
Note: N= 354; * p<.05.    
a
 natural log adjustment 
b 
multiplied by 100,000 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1. Prob of Advancing 0.58 2.54 -
2. Prior Performance 4.00 3.08 -0.09 -
3. Debt to Equity 0.25 3.53 -0.07 -0.03 -
4. Firm Size
a
8.22 0.88 -0.04 -0.02 0.02 -
5. Capital Expenditures 61.32 117.19 -0.08 0.06 -0.02 0.74* -
6. Active Program 0.55 0.5 -0.17* 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.05 -
7. FS/R&D Ratio
b
1.99 1.71 -0.15* -0.01 0.02 0.13* -0.09 0.02 -
8. Number of Projects 36.33 31.85 -0.04 -0.05 0.04 0.79* 0.81* 0.12* -0.08 -
9. Tech Diversity 0.64 0.17 -0.08 -0.02 0.11* 0.31* 0.27* 0.16* -0.01 0.41* -
10. FDA Phase 1 0.28 0.45 0.05 -0.08 -0.04 -0.2* -0.1 -0.01 -0.05 -0.17* -0.08 -
11. FDA Phase 2 0.26 0.44 0.1 -0.06 -0.03 -0.13* -0.06 -0.07 0.02 -0.13 -0.13* -0.36* -
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Table 2 
Mixed Effects Logistic Analysis Predicting Firm Innovation 
 
NOTE: N=354; †p<.10; * p<.05; **p< .01; ***p<.001 
 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Prior Performance -0.24† -0.19 -0.22† -0.19 -0.2
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Debt to Equity -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Firm Size 0.54 0.73 0.35 0.64 0.75
(0.7) (0.67) (0.73) (0.68) (0.68)
Capital Expenditures -0.01* -0.02* -0.01 -0.02* -0.02†
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Active Status -1.31* -1.19* -0.99† -1.18* -1.24*
(0.59) (0.57) (0.58) (0.57) (0.58)
FS/R&D Ratio -0.48* -1.09** 0.17 -0.24
(0.19) (0.4) (0.83) (0.27)
Number of Projects 0.03 -0.04 0.03 0.03
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Tech Diversity -0.78 -0.58 1.24 -0.81
(2.08) (2.17) (3.31) (2.09)
Phase 1 0.48 0.58 0.47 1.8†
(0.67) (0.68) (0.67) (1.04)
Phase 2 1.04† 1.09† 1.0 1.46
(0.63) (0.64) (0.64) (0.97)
FS/R&D Ratio 0.03*
× Number of Projects (0.02)
FS/R&D Ratio -1.02
× Tech Diversity (1.28)
FS/R&D Ratio -0.72
× Phase 1 (0.44)
FS/R&D Ratio -0.22
× Phase 2 (0.16)
Constant -2.63 -3.68 0.44 -4.39 -4.34
(5.59) (5.44) (6.07) (5.52) (5.58)
Drug Class Effects Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Effects Included Included Included Included Included
Year Effects Included Included Included Included Included
Log Likelihood -177.47 -171.91* -169.35* -171.57 -170.43
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Hypotheses 1a and 1b present competing ideas about the relationship between the 
number of simultaneous R&D projects and the level of financial slack relative to R&D 
spending needed to optimize the likelihood of advancing through FDA approval.  On one 
hand, firms may experience a portfolio effect that may reduce the proportion of financial 
slack relative to total R&D spending needed to optimize the probability of advancing.  
On the other hand, firms may experience a complexity effect that may increase the 
proportion of financial slack relative to total R&D spending needed to optimize the 
probability of advancing.   Empirical testing suggests that the number of R&D projects 
has a significant moderating influence.  Model 3 in Table 2 indicates that the interaction 
effect of the number of R&D projects and the financial slack-R&D ratio is significant at 
a .05 level when all controls are included.  A likelihood ratio test shows that the full 
model is also significant (p>chi
2
 = .02).   
The interaction effect becomes more significant (.004) when controls exhibiting 
multicollinearity are dropped from the model.  Given the high correlation between 
control variables (capital expenditure, active program, and total assets) and independent 
variables (financial slack-R&D ratio, total R&D projects and technological diversity) 
multicollinearity could be problematic.  In a robustness check, I re-estimated Table 2 
dropping the correlated control variables.  Results are nearly identical to those presented 
in Table 2 (significant terms and shape of the moderated relationship).  I also calculated 
variance inflation factors and no variables had variance inflation factors over five.  The 
main consequence of multicollinearity is to inflate standard error, thereby making 
hypothesis testing of the collinear variables more difficult.  However, dropping one or 
more of the correlated variables can result in omitted variable bias, particularly if there is 
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a compelling reason to include the variables (Greene, 2003; Kennedy, 2003).  For these 
reasons, all control variables are included in the models reported in Table 2. 
In a final robustness check, I re-estimated Table 2 including preclinical observations.  
Preclinical observations were initially dropped from the model because including them 
exacerbated the multicollinearity problem.  Another problem of including the preclinical 
observations was that there were relatively few successes (only 4 confirmed advances out 
of 2,650 observations), making it difficult to consider preclinical observations in project 
maturity hypotheses.  For these reasons, preclinical observations were dropped from the 
model.  However, results of Models 2 and 3 are nearly identical to those presented in 
Table 2 when preclinical observations are included (significant terms and shape of the 
moderated relationship).  To check for curvilinear effects I also tried running my model 
with the financial slack-R&D ratio variable squared, cubed, and to the fourth power.  My 
model dropped all exponential measures of the financial slack-R&D ratio because of 
collinearity with the main effect.  This provides no support for the existence of a 
curvilinear relationship between the financial slack-R&D ratio and the probability of 
advancing. 
 Figure 1 plots the relationship predicted in Model 3 in Table 2 for firms with 
many simultaneous R&D projects versus firms with few R&D projects.  I plot the slopes 
at one standard deviation above and below the mean number of R&D projects for my 
sample. The slope is plotted such that total R&D projects equals four for firms with few 
R&D projects, and 68 for firms with many R&D projects.  The relationship is consistent 
at other values of the moderator (e.g., at half of one standard deviation above and below 
the mean).  
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Figure 1 
Financial slack-R&D ratio and the number of R&D projects 
 
 
Figure 1 indicates that firms that pursue many R&D projects experience an 
increased probability of successfully advancing those projects when financial slack 
increases relative to total R&D spending.  These results give support for the complexity 
view described in Hypothesis 1b that increasing the number of R&D projects results in 
significant planning and coordination challenges.  A primary benefit of financial slack is 
the ability to cover unexpected costs that are above and beyond foreseeable expenses 
(Bromiley, 1991; Miller & Leiblein, 1996; Mishina et al., 2004).  Hence, the higher the 
level of financial slack that causes firms to optimize innovation outcomes, the more 
complex or difficult the underlying innovation is likely to be (Hall, 2002; Vicente-
Lorente, 2001).   The results conflict with Hypothesis 1a that pursuing multiple 
simultaneous R&D projects will result in a portfolio effect that decreases the proportion 
of emergency cash needed to optimize the probability of advancing.   
46 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 also indicates that firms with few R&D projects experience a significant 
decrease in the probability of successfully advancing those projects when financial slack 
increases relative to total R&D spending.  This is especially surprising considering the 
positive relationship observed for firms with many R&D projects.  A negative 
relationship suggests that the agency and opportunity costs of a high financial slack-R&D 
ratio are elevated when R&D complexity is low (few R&D projects). 
The moderating effect associated with the number of R&D projects is consistent 
with a complexity effect, but inconsistent with a portfolio effect.  However, results 
indicate that the effect of technological diversity is more ambiguous.  Hypotheses 2a and 
2b also presented competing portfolio and complexity views regarding the moderating 
influence of technological diversity.  As indicated by Model 4 in Table 2, no clear 
support can be found for either hypothesis 2a or 2b.  I found no significant moderating 
effect of technological diversity on the relationship between the financial slack-R&D 
ratio and firm innovation.   
Lastly, hypotheses 3a and 3b present divergent views about how an R&D 
project‟s nearness to completion may affect the financial slack-R&D ratio needed to 
optimize the probability of advancing.  The coefficients of the interaction terms of the 
financial slack-R&D ratio and the three variables indicating firms‟ nearness to 
completion also showed no significant difference (p>chi
2
 = 0.26).  Model 5 in Table 2 
summarizes these results which give no clear support for either hypothesis 3a or 3b. 
  Overall, results suggest that biotech firms do not experience a significant portfolio 
effect when increasing the number and diversity of innovation projects.  However, they 
may experience a complexity effect which is mainly driven by the number of innovation 
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projects in simultaneous development and not significantly affected by their degree 
technological divergence from one another.  Project maturity does not appear to have a 
significant effect on the financial slack-R&D ratio needed to optimize innovation 
outcomes.  However, the agency and opportunity costs of a high financial slack-R&D 
ratio appear to have a negative effect on firm innovation, but only when complexity is 
low (few R&D projects).   
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The main goal of this paper is to examine the effect of financial slack on firm 
innovation.  I took a unique approach to operationalizing financial slack by measuring it 
as a proportion of total R&D spending.  In addition to the hypothesis testing described 
above, there are some interesting points that emerge which may be of interest.  The 
negative relationship between innovation and the financial slack-R&D ratio observed in 
Figure 1 for firms pursuing few innovation projects suggests that there are significant 
agency effects associated with a high financial slack-R&D ratio.  However, it is unclear if 
firms that pursue many R&D projects also experience high agency and opportunity costs 
when they retain a high financial slack-R&D ratio or if these effects are prevented or 
mitigated by complexity.  It could be that significant agency and opportunity costs still 
accrue for firms with many R&D projects, but the usefulness of financial slack in 
overcoming complexity effects offsets these costs (the positive effects of financial slack 
outweigh the negative effects).   
Conversely, the complexity associated with pursuing many R&D projects may 
partially prevent the negative effects of financial slack from occurring (rather than 
offsetting them).  Agency costs of financial slack occur when managers, believing that 
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they are somewhat insulated from the negative consequences of bad decisions, become 
less inclined to expend the effort needed to make good decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Kraatz & Zajac, 2001; Williamson, 1964).  However, managers with a complex 
R&D portfolio are likely to view financial slack resources as less of a cushion or safety 
net if they perceive that those resources will be necessary to successfully innovate.  It is 
possible that this perception of necessity may mitigate the agency influences of financial 
slack.  Hence, it is unclear if the agency effects of a high financial slack-R&D ratio are 
mitigated (partially prevented) by innovation complexity, or if agency challenges still 
occur but are offset (outweighed) by the positive effects of financial slack.   
Since firm innovation is thought to be closely tied to firm performance (O‟Brien, 
2003), I also wanted to see if my results were consistent when using performance rather 
than innovation as a dependent variable.  Hence, I also ran a mixed effects linear 
regression analysis using the same variables listed under Model 3 in Table 2, only I used 
performance (the market to book ratio) as the outcome variable rather than innovation.  
The total number of R&D projects in simultaneous development also has a significant 
moderating effect on the relationship between the financial slack-R&D ratio and firm 
performance.  However, firms with many R&D projects showed a negative relationship 
between the financial slack-R&D ratio and firm performance (whereas a positive 
relationship was observed between the financial slack-R&D ratio and the probability of 
advancing).  These findings indicate that for firms with many R&D projects the financial 
slack-R&D ratio could have a positive effect on firm innovation and a simultaneous 
negative effect on firm performance.  The findings are potentially contrary to prior 
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research suggesting a strong link between firm innovation and firm performance (e.g., 
O‟Brien, 2003).   
There are two apparent explanations for how increasing financial slack-R&D ratio 
may simultaneously improve innovation but harm performance.  First, the negative 
effects of financial slack may affect other areas of the firm besides R&D.  For example, 
the agency effects of holding financial slack may not be as strong in the R&D department 
which tends to have more unexpected setbacks.  R&D managers may view financial slack 
as more necessary than marketing or production managers who tend to administer more 
predictable costs.  Hence, R&D managers may take more care in their stewardship of 
cash resources than managers in other departments.  However, this explanation is 
potentially inconsistent with Figure 1 which suggests that a high proportion of financial 
slack has an immediate negative effect on the probability of advancing for firms with few 
innovation projects.  This suggests that the opportunity and agency costs of a high 
financial slack-R&D ratio do affect the R&D department.   
The second apparent explanation is that the positive influence of financial slack 
on the progression of R&D may take some time to affect performance, while the agency 
and opportunity costs of financial slack may have a more immediate influence on firm 
performance.  The latter explanation is intuitively appealing since there is obviously 
some delay between the stages of successful R&D, commercialization and profit 
realization.  However, further research is needed to identify the exact explanation for the 
moderating effect of the number of R&D projects. 
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Further research is also needed to better understand the agency and opportunity 
costs of financial slack in firms with many R&D projects. Future scholars may want to 
explore whether pursuing a high number of R&D projects actually mitigates agency 
effects or simply offsets them.  Additionally, scholars interested in exploring the effect of 
proportional levels of financial slack on other areas of the firm may want to consider 
employing other ratios that are relevant to their subject area.  For example, researchers 
exploring the effect of financial slack on firm growth may gain useful insights by 
measuring financial slack relative to total capital expenditures.   
This research contributes to a better understanding of the project-level effects of 
financial slack on firm innovation.  The findings have important theoretical and 
managerial implications since they help distinguish between the positive and negative 
effects associated with increasing financial slack relative to R&D spending.  Findings 
also suggest that the effects associated with increasing financial slack relative to R&D 
spending influence firms at the project level (in addition to other potential department-
level, firm-level or market-level influences).   
Moreover, the results suggest that measuring financial slack as a proportion of 
total R&D spending may provide unique insights about the relationship between financial 
slack and firm innovation.  As discussed in Chapter 2, managers may have difficulty 
using the inverse U-shaped perspective to determine the optimal level of financial slack 
to retain because it suggests holding a level that is average relative to competitor firms.  
However, financial slack holdings of competitor firms may fluctuate or be kept secret.  
Moreover, it is unclear how changes in the financial slack levels of competitor firms 
would affect the relationship between financial slack and innovation within a particular 
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firm.  The R&D strategy of the firm itself seems much more likely to impact this 
relationship.  Hence, I suggest that firms should benchmark financial slack against a 
measure that is sensitive to major changes in innovation strategy (the firm‟s own R&D 
spending).  More research is needed to identify a ratio of financial slack relative to total 
R&D spending needed to optimize innovation outcomes.  Scholars must replicate similar 
research in many contexts and must consider many more potential moderating influences 
before any prescriptions that are useful to managers are likely to emerge.  However, this 
paper provides a useful starting point that future researchers may use to more effectively 
determine the optimal level of financial slack.  These prescriptions may be more useful 
because they do not require obscure, unavailable, and possibly irrelevant information (the 
financial slack levels of competitor firms).   
The degree to which firms are able to achieve high performance is strongly linked 
to both the successful management of innovation (O‟Brien, 2003) and the successful 
management of financial slack (Chakravarthy, 1986).   Moreover, the strategic dynamics 
of financial slack are likely to have increasing contemporary relevance given stakeholder 
concerns about record-high levels of idle corporate cash.  For example, the title from a 
2013 article on Bloomberg.com warns, “Cash piles up as U.S. CEOs play safe with slow-
growth economy” (Burritt, 2013).  Given stakeholder concerns and the significant agency 
and opportunity costs associated with holding high levels of idle cash, research exploring 
the effects of financial slack is likely to proliferate.  This type of scholarship has the 
potential to be a productive avenue for future researchers, particularly in the innovation 
context where the importance of financial slack tends to be enhanced.   
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